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Abstract
For research to positively impact society, it must be scientifically credible. The researcher 
plays a key role in establishing and maintaining credibility, particularly in the climate change 
field. This paper provides a structure for relating the credibility of researchers themselves to 
that of research outputs, analysing ‘researcher credibility’ with reference to three overlapping 
domains:  personal,  professional,  and  public.  The  researcher’s  role  in  each  domain  is 
considered in a reflexive way, examining the research process and the researcher’s actions. 
Varied definitions of researcher credibility and possible means to achieve it in each domain 
are  discussed,  drawing on relevant  cross-disciplinary literature.  We argue  that,  in  certain 
contexts,  the  actions  of  researchers  can  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  credibility  of  their 
research. There is scope for broadening researcher credibility to include more public-oriented 
behaviours. This, however, may be contentious and problematic: there are potential conflicts 
between public action and professional credibility, with the latter usually taking precedence. 
By  contrast,  though  personal  action  (or  inaction)  rarely  affects  professional  credibility, 
researchers’ personal behaviours may influence public perceptions of research credibility and 
the importance of addressing climate change.
Keywords: climate policy; personal activities; public engagement; research ethics.
1
Introduction
 
Research’s  influence  stems  from  both  the  knowledge  presented  and  the  process  of 
knowledge  creation  (Mitchell  et  al., 2006),  making  examination  of  the  research  process 
essential  for  empowering  science  to  respond  to  humanity’s  greatest  challenges.  For 
international environmental assessments to influence policymakers, they must be viewed as 
credible, salient, and legitimate (Mitchell et al. 2006). As such research outputs are produced 
by ‘researchers’, expert legitimacy is tripartite, involving knowledge, experts, and institutions 
through  which  they  give  advice,  each  requiring  explicit  attention.  Past  discussions  have 
insufficiently emphasised the latter  two (Jasanoff,  2005),  leaving a gap in understandings 
scientific legitimacy and credibility. 
 
Credibility is of particular consequence in climate change research,1 which is increasingly 
politicised and polarised in public fora, with the research community’s collective reputation 
at  stake.  Illustrations include the UEA Climate Research Unit  (CRU) email  controversies 
(Gillis  & Kaufman,  2011;  Maibach  et  al.,  2012)  and the  dispute  between  scientist  Peter 
Gleick  and  the  ‘climate-denialist’  Heartland  Institute  (Goldenberg,  2012).  There 
simultaneously remains a failure to effectively address the challenge framed by the research 
community  (Black,  2011).  Responsibility  for  this  lies  with  both  policymakers  and 
researchers, as the scientific framing of climate change informs policymakers’ understanding 
of its urgency. The research community thus finds itself at a critical juncture to reflexively 
examine  the questions: what does it mean to be a credible climate change researcher and 
produce credible research outputs?  This paper aims to stimulate and inform debate on this 
topic, as climate research’s implications make it crucial to demarcate whether criticism is 
legitimate or not amidst intense politicisation (Keller, 2011).
Based on a wide, cross-disciplinary review of conceptions of credibility,  we consider 
how the  credibility  of  research  outputs  (hereafter  ‘scientific  credibility’,  including  social 
science) is related to that of researchers (‘researcher credibility’). We present an analytical 
framework unpacking researcher credibility into three domains: personal, professional, and 
public. We then consider potential conflicts for researchers in maintaining credibility across 
these by drawing on diverse literature.2 Scientific and researcher credibility extend beyond 
the professional domain but are rarely assessed holistically and systematically. Researchers 
seldom openly discuss personal behaviour; when occurring, such discussions quickly become 
emotionally charged. This paper aims to stimulate structured discussion within and outside 
the academic community on researchers’ professional, private, and public behaviours, as they 
impact scientific credibility. Its insights have relevance for broader discussions of credibility 
in multidisciplinary, controversial, and policy-relevant fields.
1 Including mitigation and adaptation work across physical, natural, and social sciences.
2 We focus on ‘Western’ research norms.
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To set-up  fruitful  discussion,  the  next  section  outlines  key definitions,  introducing  a 
simple  framework for  viewing credibility.  Sections  3-5  then  delve  into  credibility  within 
professional, public, and personal domains, respectively. Section 6 blurs these constructed 
boundaries to discuss tensions and trade-offs in maintaining credibility across all three before 
Section 7 synthesises conclusions.
Key Concepts
This paper is reflexive, examining the research process and researchers’ actions/creeds. 
Reflexivity involves considering research conduct and how this  moulds outputs (Holland, 
1999),  a  process  essential  for  scientists  cultivating  their  trustworthiness  (Wynne,  2006). 
Reflexive  consideration  extends  to  the  researcher’s  network/communities  (Hardy  et  al., 
2001), and requires the researcher assess their impact on the object investigated. Therefore 
we  will  explore  broader  research  practices,  not  just  those  associated  with 
methodological/analytical decision-making. Some criticise reflexivity as difficult  to assess 
(Seale, 1999), prioritising researcher over research (Finlay, 2002; Clegg & Hardy, 1996), or 
impairing  creativity  (Weick,  1999).  We  thus  cast  reflexivity  as  a  process  for  examining 
credibility. 
Bocking (2004, p.164) defines scientific credibility as: ‘the extent to which science is 
recognised as a  source of  reliable  knowledge…[instead of]  random observations,  or…the 
preferences of a particular interest group’. Extending the concept to researchers themselves, 
we include both inward- and outward-facing elements, and credibility is recognised to be 
relational—between  a  researcher  and  an  audience.  Thus,  concepts  such  as  reliability, 
integrity,  trustworthiness,  and legitimacy,  while  applying to  ‘the  science’ itself,  also  help 
construct ‘researcher credibility’ through subjective judgements of researchers’ peers, policy 
audience,  friends,  and the  public.  Outward-facing  components  can  increase  in  weight  as 
scientific  debates  filter  through  the  media,  who  often  scrutinise  researchers  as  much  as 
research. 
Frequently,  ‘credibility’ is  used  as  shorthand  for  ideas  of  consensus,  truth,  and 
separating ‘belief’ from ‘fact’. Consensus is an indicator of scientific credibility, revealing the 
scientific  community’s  confidence  level  and positively impacting public  belief  in  climate 
change  and  support  for  mitigation  policies  (Ding  et  al.,  2011;  McCright  et  al.,  2013). 
However,  attempts  to  establish  the  reliability  of  scientific  claims  solely  by  appealing  to 
consensus  are  insufficient—several  once-consensus  models  were  later  proven  incorrect 
(Fraser,  2006;  Russell,  1964).  Further,  there  are  limits  to  consensus  amongst  an 
interdisciplinary  group;  attempts  to  establish  it  may  omit  contrarian  views,  minimise 
uncertainties, and foster conservativity (Hulme & Mahony, 2010; Oppenheimer et al., 2007; 
Hansen, 2007). Credibility must be viewed more broadly.
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Figure 1 thus illustrates our framework for analysing researcher credibility based on 
distinctions  and  interactions  between  three  domains  in  which  the  researcher  exists: 
professional, personal, and public.
Figure 1. Domains of researcher credibility. 
US Academy of Sciences President Ralph Cicerone, referencing the CRU controversy, 
writes,  ‘the relationship between science and society depends on the personal conduct of 
scientists in all that they do’ (Cicerone, 2010, p.624). Our definition of researcher credibility 
thus  transcends the professional  environment  of  academia,  deriving also from public  and 
personal  domains.  Sections 3-5 examine each in detail,  emphasising achieving credibility 
beyond a solely professional audience and may motivate increased public engagement. 
Beliefs about credibility vary within an interdisciplinary research community. This is 
partly determined by disciplinary paradigms, which include assumptions about epistemology 
(what one can know) and ontology (what exists). Beliefs associated with inquiry paradigms 
(e.g.,  positivism, founded in natural sciences, and constructivism, increasingly adopted by 
social  scientists) largely shape what individuals within that particular ‘expert  community’ 
count  as  credible  research.  (Cohen  et  al.,  2007).  Such  differences  inform definitions  of 
professional credibility, leading to variations within climate change research, a diverse field. 
Valuations of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ also vary culturally and temporally (Shapin,  1999). 
Researcher  credibility  is  thus  subjective  and  interpretive,  influenced  by  context  and 
‘epistemological roots’. With these caveats in mind, we proceed.
Professional credibility
Academia  is  largely self-regulating,  driven by internal  behavioural  norms (Dasgupta, 
2000). ‘Truth’ is achieved through constant challenge/debate, and a reputation for credibility 
is  central  to a successful career.  An academic researcher gains professional credibility by 
obtaining  academic  qualifications  and  adhering  to  common  research  principles  (e.g., 
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Shavelson & Towne, 2002) such as observing ethical standards (e.g., acknowledging funding, 
avoiding interest conflicts), publishing peer-reviewed research, methodological transparency 
and data availability (CSEPP, 2009). 
These  norms  safeguard  reputations  of  the  individual  and  the  academic  research 
institution (Dasgupta, 2000); the ensuing practices are central to research careers (Hardy et  
al., 2001). ‘Publish or perish’ is the mantra of early-career researchers seeking advancement: 
professional  credibility,  which  includes  expertise  and  status,  is  commonly  assessed  by 
citation counts and publication analyses (e.g.,  Anderegg  et al. 2010).  Leadership of large 
projects (e.g., IPCC assessments) is oft-based on ‘contributory expertise’ (i.e. demonstrated 
competence in a specialist field, often measured partly by citations) (Collins & Evans 2002, 
p.257).
Based on such principles, researchers gain professional credibility, which translates 
into  influence  within academia as  newer  researchers  seek to  enhance  their  credibility by 
aligning  with  pre-eminence  (Latour,  1987).  For  example,  Yohe  &  Oppenheimer  (2011) 
discuss how IPCC authors’ judgements whilst constructing SRES emissions scenarios have 
shaped nearly every ensuing climate change impact/adaptation study due to the ‘need to be 
anchored around one of the SRES storylines in large measure because they had the IPCC 
brand  attached’ (p.634).  Funders  with  vested  interests  in  outcomes  (e.g.,  environmental 
research underwritten by environmental NGOs) may impact scientific credibility. If research 
appears compromised by sponsors’ interests, the researchers’ professional credibility will be 
cast  into  doubt.  Conversely,  research  may  gain  scientific  credibility  if  findings  counter 
backers’ interests. For example, the recent Berkeley climate-change meta-analysis, initially 
championed  by ‘climate  sceptics’,  may have  boosted  climate  science  credibility  when it 
yielded findings generally aligning with the consensus (BEST, 2011).
 
The Concordat,  an  agreement  between funders  and employers  of  UK researchers, 
posits six researcher responsibilities, including transferring and exploiting knowledge where 
appropriate to benefit employer, economy, and society (Research Concordat 2008). Thus, in 
addition  to  conducting  the  rigorous  research  required  to  build  professional  credibility,  a 
researcher must ensure that research’s credibility is upheld in the public domain, discussed 
next.
Public credibility
Maintaining  credibility  in  the  public  domain  raises  questions  of  whether/how  a 
researcher  should  engage  publicly  –  including  informing versus  activism –  and  how 
engagement  (or  lack thereof)  might  affect  professional  and personal  credibility and vice-
versa. The first two questions are addressed here; the latter will be considered in Section 6.
‘The public’ is a construct (Wynne, 2006), here defined only as neither the academic 
community nor the researcher’s close acquaintances. Given this heterogeneity, it is helpful to 
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think  of  multiple  ‘publics’,  constituting  different  educational  backgrounds,  political 
ideologies,  and  cultural/social  contexts  (Blake,  1999;  Leizerowitz  et  al.  2013)  and 
manifesting various types of scepticism (e.g., ‘attribution’ versus ‘science’ sceptics; Painter, 
2011).  Knowledge  will  be  interpreted  differently  as  it  travels  amongst  these  audiences 
(Jasanoff, 1996, 2010; Blake, 1999), who may evaluate credibility differently (Mitchell et al., 
2006). This heterogeneity complicates public engagement, as do complex cognitive factors 
involved  in  understanding  climate  change  (e.g.,  Grothmann  &  Patt,  2005),  incomplete 
knowledge about public understanding of science (Shapin, 1999), and scientists’ imperfect 
understanding  of  ‘science  in  society’  (Pielke,  2007).  Keeping  this  heterogeneity  and 
multiplicity in mind, for clarity we speak of credibility in the public domain. 
Researchers are responsible for maintaining their work’s scientific credibility in this 
public  domain  (Research  Concordat,  2008).  Research  findings  disseminated  by 
media/political  actors  may  be  misrepresented;  for  example,  media  attempts  to  present 
‘balance’ often exaggerate disagreement within the research community (Boykoff & Boykoff, 
2004;  Painter,  2011),  and  there  are  numerous  powerful  interests  involved in  discrediting 
climate science (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). This may contribute to low public confidence in 
climate change research. For example, opinion polls suggest sizeable portions of UK and US 
publics ‘doubt’ climate science (Carrington, 2011; Pew Center, 2009; Stafford, 2010; UPI, 
2011),  trust  for  climate  science is  much lower than trust  in science (Scientific  American, 
2010),  and  citizens  and  government  officials  are  generally  less  concerned  than  climate 
scientists (Weber, 2010).3 
Given the strength of motivated reasoning against climate change and the intractability 
(and irrationality) of some individual’s views (Hart & Nisbet 2012), some segments of this 
demographic may be unreachable; it would be unfair to expect researchers to overcome such 
barriers.  However,  public  engagement  (research-related  interaction  outside  one’s 
personal/professional networks) may help counter the undermining of scientific credibility 
and  reduce  the  likelihood  of  research  misrepresentation.  Interpreting  the  principle  that 
research should be disclosed to encourage critique to apply outside the research community 
further encourages public engagement. ‘Outreach’ activities are often a condition of grants 
and academic contracts. Controversial, timely, or policy-relevant research is often covered by 
media, regardless of whether researchers wish to engage publicly. The reticent scientist may 
then need to engage to limit potential damage to scientific and professional credibility.
Public  engagement to correct  misinterpretations is  widely encouraged as a  scientific 
responsibility (Lackey, 2007); some encourage active political involvement (Keller, 2011). 
Yet  the  debate  is  neither  novel  nor  one  sided.  Albert  Einstein  set  himself  against  public 
engagement by scientists, stating that, it is the duty of a scientist to remain obscure’ (Douglas 
1996, p.100). The (heavily critiqued) ‘linear model’ of science policy sees ‘basic’ science as 
3 As  methodologies,  samples,  and  question  phrasings  vary,  findings  should  be  treated 
cautiously.
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informing  but  removed  from resulting  policy  (Pielke,  2007).  Somerville  (2010,  p.513-4) 
allows a limited role for researchers to guide the public to recognise ‘junk science’, after 
which the public must, ‘learn about what science has discovered and accept it’. In contrast, 
Jasanoff (2010, p.81) argues for a need to, ‘enlarge the circles of accountability within which 
scientific judgment has to prove itself’.
Since people typically use information to confirm, not disprove, existing beliefs when 
dealing with ambiguities (Lord  et al. 1979, in Patt & Schröter, 2008), public confidence in 
climate change research will not likely increase without effort to ensure research findings are 
communicated clearly and unambiguously. The potential for dire ramifications and the belief-
action link give climate change researchers a unique responsibility to ensure their research’s 
public credibility (Keller, 2011). Paul Nurse thus argues that ‘scientists have got to get out 
there’ to  counter  doubts  over  ‘whether  the  public  actually  trusts  scientists’,  including on 
global warming (Horizon, 2011). Public statements asserting professional consensus (e.g., 
1700 British scientists declaring confidence in evidence for anthropogenic global warming; 
Price et al., 2009), are a generally uncontroversial move towards public engagement. Yet are 
such didactic statements sufficient? As ‘informing’ has not led to effective action by either 
policymakers or individuals, more proactive engagement may be required. 
Comprehension/utilisation  of  knowledge  could  be  encouraged  via  innovative 
communication  methods  (e.g.,  Marx  et  al.,  2007;  Lorenzoni  &  Pidgeon,  2006).  More 
controversially, researchers could directly interact with policymakers, for example, signing 
public letters for action, issuing policy opinions, or joining protests. Recent examples include 
Australian scientists petitioning Parliament and launching a publicity campaign to convince 
Australians they could rely on scientific evidence to inform decisions (Science & Technology 
Australia, 2012) and scientist James Hansen, arrested outside the White House for protesting 
oil  pipeline  construction  (Drajem,  2011).  The  2012  ‘State  of  the  Planet’  Declaration, 
representing views of many sustainability researchers, argued forcefully for greater researcher 
involvement in policy-making (Brito & Stafford Smith, 2012).
There is a difference between engaging on issues of science and those of policy; we 
must not conflate views of ‘things done in the name of science’ with views of science itself 
(Wynne,  2006,  p.214).  While  scientific  papers  and  grants  commonly  emphasise  policy-
relevance  and  include  policy  recommendations,  these  rarely  translate  into  policy-making 
involvement.  Indeed  many  argue  this  ought  be  avoided  as  potentially  damaging  to  the 
scientist’s professional and public credibility. For example, environmental journalist Andrew 
Freedman  criticised  Hansen’s  advocacy  as,  ‘threaten[ing]  to  paint  the  AMS  [American 
Meteorological Society] as having a political agenda’—a sentiment shared by some AMS 
members  (Freedman,  2009;  Revkin  2009a,  2009b).  Physicist  Freeman  Dyson  argued, 
‘Hansen has turned his science into ideology’ (Dawidoff, 2009, p. 4). 
Speaking about  ecological  policy,  Lackey (2007) argues  that  while  science  is  not 
value-free, this does not make all science normative and engagement by scientists ought be 
non-normative,  explaining  relevant  findings  but  not advocating  policy.  The  International 
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Council  for  Science  similarly  encourages  scientists  to  clearly  separate  professional  from 
personal  opinions  (CFRS,  2010).  Alternatively,  Sarewitz  (2004)  argues  scientists  should 
generally avoid policymaking and, if engaging, should state their private interests and values. 
Pielke (2007) agrees  that engaging on an issue like climate change can further politicise 
science, with scientists possibly becoming ‘stealth advocates’. Yet he argues that instead of 
withdrawing, scientists should stay involved, acting as ‘honest brokers of policy alternatives’ 
who openly associate science with potential courses of action (Pielke, 2007). Others (e.g., 
Yohe  &  Oppenheimer,  2011)  argue  that  science  communication  should  be  done  by 
communicators, not scientists.
There is thus no clear agreement on how to maintain public credibility, although most 
researchers would agree this is desirable. For this paper, we assume most climate change 
researchers regard climate change as a serious problem, believing action should be taken to 
mitigate  its  causes.  Yet  mitigation  approaches  vary  in  scale/scope,  with  widespread 
disagreement  over  whether  leadership  should  be  top-down (by governments,  considering 
individual action effectively useless on its own) or bottom-up (collective/individual action as 
the only realistic solution, given political and economic barriers constraining governments). 
We next discuss whether maintaining credibility may necessitate action within one’s own life
—e.g., campaigning for top-down change or altering consumption habits and encouraging 
others to do likewise.
 Personal credibility
Shapin (1999) argues  modern  life  requires  trusting  experts  to  be well-intentioned; 
often credibility is  inferred from character and truth established in personal,  ‘emotionally 
textured’ domains  (1999,  p.10-11).  Similarly,  Lancet editor  Richard Horton argues  public 
trust connects to individual scientists’ integrity (Shapin, 2004). While applying to researchers’ 
conduct  in  each  domain,  integrity  (adherence  to  moral/ethical  principles,  demonstrated 
through actions) and character have particular resonance within personal lives. The climate 
change  researcher  is  in  an  unusual  position:  aspects  of  their  personal  behaviour  (and 
associated carbon footprint) cannot be viewed in isolation from their professional expertise. 
Here we consider aspects of integrity and credibility in this personal domain. 
In global and national terms, researchers in economically ‘advanced’ countries are 
typically financially privileged, with salaries falling considerably above median (IFS, 2011; 
ONS, 2010). This is significant as income is a decent proxy for emissions (Davis & Caldeira,  
2010).  Researchers’  education  and  almost-unparalleled  access  to  state-of-the-science 
information  arguably  further  obligates  them  to  demonstrate  integrity  and  credibility  by 
mitigating their  own emissions.  Unfettered knowledge access is  not universally available; 
academic journals are prohibitively expensive for individuals outside the system, and in many 
areas, internet access is restricted. While a layperson may not necessarily have the scientific 
literacy/information required to understand the mitigation challenge or how it can be met 
through practical action, the researcher can claim no such ignorance. Applying a combination 
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of the ‘polluter/consumer pays’ and ‘ability to pay’ principles (Caney, 2010) thus arguably 
places  a  special  obligation  on  Western  researchers  to  mitigate  their  emissions,  as  both 
disproportionately responsible for emissions and best able (and informed) to make individual 
reductions.  Yet  researchers  tend  to  have  above-average  carbon-intensive  travel  lifestyles, 
making it likely that they are amongst the largest individual emitters. (Høyer 2009) estimates 
international air travel emissions for a typical Norwegian climate change researcher as eight 
times the national mean. 
However, in a diverse climate change research community, all researchers may not 
actively want to mitigate their emissions. Affluent and mobile, researchers tend to benefit 
from the status quo, which they may believe imposes no undue burden on future generations. 
If  the  researcher  believes  addressing  climate  change  necessitates  changing  energy 
consumption, one can argue that specialist knowledge obliges them to be an agent of change. 
Simply imparting information to others is unlikely to produce change, however, due to the 
‘value-action’ gap and motivated reasoning (Blake, 1999; Hulme, 2009; Sarewitz, 2010; Hart 
& Nisbet, 2011). Imparted information has impact when it captures the audience’s attention, 
gains  their  involvement  and  overcomes  potential  scepticism  (Stern,  1999).  Personal 
motivational behaviour (e.g., peer pressure) may help influence behaviour change (Vermeir & 
Verbeke,  2006).  Researchers  are  well-positioned  to  influence  their  private  networks  by 
sharing relevant knowledge with family, friends, and communities on a personalised basis - 
such  relationships  may  offer  considerable  potential  for  influencing  individual  action 
(Leizerowitz  et al.,  2013). Leading by example (e.g.,  a ‘sustainable’ lifestyle), researchers 
may help shift underlying values, beliefs, and mistrusts. Conversely, the perceived hypocrisy 
of an informed but ‘emissions-profligate’ researcher could convince associates that change is 
neither required nor attainable. A climate change researcher who flies to distant destinations 
and drives a 4x4 thus damages their personal and public credibility and potentially that of the 
emissions-reduction message. 
Amongst  researchers,  engaging  with  family,  friends,  and  local  communities  on 
behavioural climate change issues is considered a personal decision dependent upon one’s 
own ideologies and those manifesting in one’s personal network. The decision to engage (or 
not) in individual leadership to maintain personal credibility may, however, impact public and 
professional credibility, as addressed next.
Tensions in achieving ‘holistic’ credibility
This artificial tripartite division of ‘domains’ was adopted to structure a discussion 
that  can  easily become muddled.  In  this  section,  we purposefully  ‘muddy the  waters’ to 
address the interesting (and hotly debated) tensions between these domains. 
Professional-Public Tensions
As mentioned in Section Three,  there is  evident  tension between professional and 
public  domains:  much  of  this,  and  much  of  the  historic  debate  over  scientists’ public 
9
communication  centres on the question of advocacy versus information. Many commentators 
(e.g.,  critics  of  Hansen’s  activism)  have  argued  public  activism undermines  professional 
credibility;  policy  advocacy  or  campaigning  harms  the  scientist’s  impartiality,  providing 
fodder to climate change deniers and inviting them to impugn research validity.4 This can 
influence science: while empirical disagreements are typically negotiated through scientific 
journal papers and responses, this process is not necessarily value neutral—the harshest peer-
review scrutineers are those with views opposing the author’s (Sarewitz, 2004).
Some  question  the  assumptions  of  the  ‘activism  undermines  credibility’ argument. 
Jasanoff (1996), for example, argues scientists are embedded in a social context; scientific 
knowledge is co-produced by scientists  and  society and cannot be independent of political 
context.  Many  pragmatic  scientists  would  agree.  For  example,  in  a  2006  survey  of 
conservation  biologists,  the  majority  believed  journals  should  publish  research  papers 
advocating policy preferences (Scott et al., 2007). An apolitical stance could arguably be an 
unrealistic  ‘ideal’ in  climate  change  research,  since  political  decisions  have  large-scale 
consequences. Non-dogmatic political views, based on relevant science, are compatible with 
unbiased  research  and  communication  of  findings.  Yet  criticisms  of  Hansen  and  other 
scientists engaged in advocacy show such opinions are far from universal. 
Professional–public tension may be particularly acute for social  scientists, for whom 
influencing  behaviour  may  be  an  (implicit)  research  aim,  with  no  clear  line  between 
‘information’ and  ‘advocacy’.  It  may  also  challenge  early-career  researchers,  seeking  to 
establish themselves but also part of the generation expected to lead social change. Often 
drawn to climate change research by personal interest and belief in the necessity of curbing 
emissions,  researchers  may  find  themselves  disagreeing  with  particular  government 
actions/inactions and feel compelled to join public calls for stronger action. This contrasts 
with the common academic view that professional credibility demands researchers set aside 
their  citizens’ rights/responsibilities  to  hold  the  government  accountable  on  their  area  of 
expertise.
This norm’s strength is evidenced by how few researchers break ranks; dissenters are 
notable for their scarcity.  One such researcher is American early-career glaciologist  Jason 
Box. Arrested at the same demonstration as Hansen, Box defended his decision to protest by 
saying, ‘I couldn't maintain my self-respect if I didn't go’, not considering activism at odds 
with  professional  credibility  (McGowan,  2011).  By  protesting,  Hansen  and  Box  made 
personal decisions, weighing the moral imperative to speak out against potential harms to 
their  (and their  institutions’)  professional  standing.  This  could,  by some arguments  (e.g., 
4 This applies across the political  divide: scholarship by ‘climate sceptics’ has also been 
criticised by non-‘sceptical’ academics for being influenced by the authors’ political biases 
(Lewandowsky, 2011), and scientists with their own political loyalties and ideologies (backed 
by industry and political actors with financial resources and media acumen) have attacked 
and misrepresented research accepted by most of their peers (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
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Lackey,  2007),  damage  the  overall  scientific  credibility  of  climate  change  research  if 
researchers are seen as having an agenda. Yet one can also argue that while the researcher 
should not undermine scientific credibility of research, entering the profession does not annul 
their right to petition/protest: concern over ‘credibility as a scientist’ should not cause the 
scientist to ‘disregard his credibility as a human being and voter with genuine convictions’. 
(Eipper 1970, p.35)
Keller  (2011,  p.19)  suggests  scientists  should engage  and  would  gain  additional 
credibility  by broadening allowable  critics  beyond intra-disciplinary peer  review.  Hansen 
(2007) similarly argues that ‘scientific reticence’ inhibits effective communication on climate 
change. However, engaging in this way could prove counterproductive if it drew attention to 
intra-academy disputes or highlighted professional behaviours vulnerable to criticism--e.g., 
frequent  flights  to  conferences—and  which  potentially  undermine  public  credibility  of 
climate science.  Yet  hiding  behaviours  and disputes  behind academic veils  is  unlikely to 
safeguard  credibility—the  IPCC  Himalayan  glacier  error,  for  example,  became  more 
damaging to scientific credibility when not openly corrected and explained (Nature, 2010). 
Thus,  work  should  be  defended  publicly  only  once  established  as  scientifically  credible 
through rigorous peer review. 
Professional-Personal Tensions 
In defending his activism, Jason Box alluded to how professional norms can be in 
tension  with  personal  credibility.  As  discussed  in  Section  Five,  public  action  may  be 
motivated  by internal  views  of  credibility  (‘self-respect’)  but  constrained by the  wish to 
preserve professional credibility. For example, a researcher may feel responsible to engage 
the  public  because  of  her  specialist  knowledge  or  because  she  thinks  engaging only her 
personal network is inadequate. Weighing against these personal beliefs is the concern that 
public  activism may harm professional  credibility.  Conversely,  having to  regularly attend 
conferences may be at odds with personal goals if it means leading a high-emissions work 
life. While an established academic may lose little ‘sitting out’ a conference if attendance 
would require air travel (e.g., Anderson in Hudson, 2012), the early-career researcher may 
miss  a  valuable  opportunity  to  build  their  professional  reputation/network.  There  are 
opportunity costs associated with both attending and not.
Inverting the orthodoxy, an alternative analysis of the relationship between personal 
and  professional  credibility  might  argue  that  hypocritical  personal  behaviour  (i.e.  acting 
inconsistently with  research  implications)  undermines  scientific  credibility of  research.  If 
reducing consumption-based emissions is a central message of the research community, then 
researchers’ personal  behaviours  are  legitimate  subjects  of  scientific  scrutiny.  Thus,  if  a 
researcher’s  work  posits  that  effective  mitigation  can  be  achieved  through  widespread 
behaviour changes, then their own un-modified consumption undermines that hypothesis. In 
this view, there is a logical inconsistency between researchers’ scientific claims about the 
potential for mitigation through behaviour change and their abrogation of responsibility for 
modifying their own consumption. 
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Alternatively, one could view the researcher’s absent personal mitigation as highlighting 
the embeddedness of decisions in one’s sociotechnical landscape: social norms are intricately 
related  to  fossil-carbon-reliant  production/consumption  systems  (Shove,  2003).  This 
perspective  suggests  a  broader  sociotechnical  transformation  is  required  to  stimulate 
transition in practices. Such systemic changes would then steer high-emitting practices in less 
energy-intensive directions.
Personal-Public Tensions
Such  conflicts  between  personal  and  professional  credibility  and  the  apparent 
hypocrisy  revealed  could  also  undermine  wider  scientific  credibility  of  climate  change 
research. Increasing public engagement compounds this tension; damaging public credibility 
becomes  likelier  as  barriers  between  personal  and  public  domains  are  removed  and 
researchers’ behaviours  become more visible.  Those entering the  public  sphere  may face 
personal and professional ramifications, particularly when political  actors actively seek to 
discredit  researchers:  atmospheric  scientist  Ben Santer’s efforts  defending himself  against 
‘mudslinging’ hampered  both  work  productivity  and  personal  relationships  (Oreskes  & 
Conway, 2010), Michael Mann’s ‘hockey stick’ graph engendered assaults on his integrity 
from ardent denialists (Mann, 2012), and several climate scientists were labelled ‘criminals’ 
by US Senator James Inhofe (Nature,  2010).  Such direct attacks  actively militate  against 
credibility in the eyes of hardened climate change ‘sceptics’, with views deeply sown by 
powerful interests. This may place researchers in no-win situations: accused of hypocrisy for 
failing to ‘practise what they preach’ or dismissed as having a ‘green agenda’ when adapting 
their lifestyles to reflect research implications.
Arguably, some climate change research branches do not directly use mitigation claims; 
researchers  in  those  areas  would  not  fall  foul  of  the  abovementioned  ‘self-falsifying 
behavioural  inconsistency  trap’.  While  a  researcher  might  claim  it  is  possible  to  bring 
emissions  down  and  agree  top  emitters  must  cut  the  most,  they  might  not  recognise 
themselves amongst this group or may recognise their membership of the high-emitting group 
but believe their needs are somehow special or that others can more easily make reductions 
on their behalf.
While these counter-arguments might  sidestep the logical-inconsistency trap (i.e.  the 
professional–personal  conflict),  they  cannot  disguise  the  appearance  of  hypocrisy  (the 
personal–public conflict), likely to draw stern criticism from those outside the professional 
domain. Maintaining public credibility may well depend on researchers visibly demonstrating 
belief in the science, for example by personally mitigating emissions. Furthermore, the UK 
Research Concordat’s instruction to, ‘transfer and exploit knowledge …’ (2008, p.12), could 
be interpreted to mean that, with regard to mitigation, researchers are enjoined to lead by 
example. It may be difficult to credibly transfer knowledge about climate change mitigation 
to the public and policymakers otherwise. A similar sentiment is found in the ‘State of the 
Planet’  Declaration’s  enjoinder  to  researchers  to  ‘show  leadership  at  all  levels’  on 
sustainability issues (Brito & Stafford-Smith, 2012, p.4).
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Achieving credibility across all three domains is thus challenging: the researcher may 
struggle between ‘hypocritical  detached scientist’ and ‘activist  partisan’.  Some aspects  of 
credibility are out of a researcher’s control, dependent on extraneous factors, others’ actions, 
or the socio-political  context.  For example,  media editors may polarise issues to increase 
sales, manifesting a wider social norm of seeking ‘controversy’, and misinformation can be 
rapidly and anonymously propagated on the internet. (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). However, 
researchers  still  have  considerable  control  over  their  own  actions’ bearing  on  personal, 
professional, and public credibility and must exercise decisions accordingly.
Conclusions
This paper has examined ‘researcher credibility’ in depth, considering epistemological 
foundations,  manifestations  in  public,  personal,  and  professional  domains,  and  tensions 
arising from trying to simultaneously maintain credibility across all three. While  credibility 
has rarely been assessed to include personal and public-facing behaviours, it was argued that 
such holistic interpretation has merit  and there are numerous tensions between professional, 
public,  and personal  motivations  and actions.  In  cases  of  conflict,  however,  professional 
credibility conventionally trumps personal or public-facing concerns.
Several authors cited herein have suggested ways to enhance credibility of researchers 
and their  science, including: more transparent publication/comments procedures; openness 
about  uncertainty;  explicit  separation of  ‘advocacy’  from ‘science’  in  publications;  better 
public/media communications,  including about  peer review; wider research dissemination; 
and better science education.  When policy debates are motivated by differences in values 
rather than science, researchers may seek to shift discourse onto these differences, preventing 
science  from  becoming  a  scapegoat  (Lackey,  2007)  or  engage  in  ‘value  advocacy’  by 
speaking  about  the  values  leading  them  to  consider  climate  change  an  urgent  threat 
(Fischhoff, 2007). Where debates hinge on framing differences, identifying these underlying 
assumptions can also facilitate more productive discussions.  Such helpful efforts should be 
promoted; Maibach et al.  (2012) highlight examples already underway. Yet more is needed. 
Adopting definitions of credibility encompassing public and private domains—e.g., including 
researchers’ willingness to publicly recommend actions based on their findings or personally 
put these into practice—could help ameliorate climate scepticism.
Although individual actions are socially embedded and some aspects of a researcher’s 
credibility are out of their control, individual actions remain crucially influential.  Climate 
change researchers’ present personal and professional behaviours may generally contribute 
more to the climate change problem than its solution—despite researchers’ privileges putting 
them  in  prime  position  to  personally  mitigate.  Better  leadership  by  researchers,  both 
personally and publicly, would help. Societal barriers between ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ 
selves  have  been  increasingly  perforated  by  technological  changes,  offering  novel 
opportunities for public interaction. By honestly discussing their own challenges in achieving 
a ‘green’ lifestyle—or not—researchers may help sway sceptics. This would require a shift in 
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values  and practices  within  the  research  community,  recognising that  the  divide between 
professional credibility and public/personal action is false and that personal actions can affect 
public views of scientific credibility.
Within academia, such discussions of personal behaviour (e.g., conference travel) should 
be  welcomed,  not  hushed—only by acknowledging  these  tensions  can  the  field  learn  to 
balance them. More broadly, discussions should focus on what individuals within each of the 
professional,  public  and  personal  domains  expect  of  science  and  its  researchers.  These 
expectations  shape  how  individuals  define  credibility,  a  fundamentally  relative  concept. 
There is thus no definitive end-point at which research can be deemed universally credible; 
with a fuller understanding of expectations, however, scope for mutual understanding will 
widen.  This  paper  does  not  attempt  to  prescribe  a  solution  but  rather  open  a  space  for 
structured  debate.  It  is  difficult  to  present  universal,  generalisable  best  practices;  each 
individual researcher must decide the role they will play—a Ph.D. in a climate-change-related 
subject neither forces adoption of a low-energy lifestyle nor annuls a citizen’s right/ability to 
protest.  We  thus  advocate  opening  the  climate  change  credibility  debate  to  proactively 
embrace its political, subjective, and multi-actor nature, with researchers reflecting on how 
they balance tensions between the three domains and what trade-offs they ultimately concede.
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